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Nellis 1
Economic Representation in Democracy
Tyler Nellis

The concept of democracy and the necessary qualities within this form of governance
have long been theorized by political thinkers. A large portion of the field focuses on the need
for representation based on cultural, ethnic, or gender identity, the need for equal deliberation
among citizens, the usefulness of dialogue within the political sphere, and the need for diverse
skill sets in decision-making bodies as the necessary qualities within a democracy. However,
with the current condition of economic disparity in modern society, there may be a key quality
that must be present in a democracy that is apparently lacking from the theoretical discussion.
After working through previous thinkers’ work on the already established necessary qualities of
democracy as well as the rationale for why democracy is the most effective form of governance,
the lack of discussion on the concept of economic representation will be discussed. This will lead
into the argument that economic representation is a necessity for democratic governance in order
to avoid the limited inclusion that a democracy without it would achieve, as well as why
economic representation is a stronger quality of recognition in a democracy than the qualities
discussed in previous works.
According to Sheldon S. Wolin, “democracy is a project concerned with the political
potentialities of ordinary citizens, that is, with their possibilities for becoming political beings
through the self-discovery of common concerns and of modes of action for realizing them”
(Wolin, 31). As Wolin states that a democracy is concerned with the political potentialities of
citizens, it also seems necessary that this potential must be equivalent from one citizen to the
next. In other words, if democracy is concerned with the political potentials of citizens, then it
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seems to follow that these potentials must be equal among citizens to create an egalitarian
political system. This is not to say that every citizen must have equal political responsibilities at
all times (a representative democracy clearly provides greater responsibility to current
representatives), but to say that each citizen must have equal opportunities to participate in the
political sphere. Every citizen must have equal paths of democratic realization in order to prevent
certain citizens from having greater possibilities in the political realm. If a certain group of
citizens more frequently have the ability to hold a position of power, such as a legislative
representative, in their respective democracy, then they have greater democratic potential and in
turn have greater democratic influence. Wolin continues to claim that political leadership does
not necessarily work to cultivate free-thinking among the population, but instead functions as a
sort of “management of collective desires, resentments, anger, fantasies, fears, and hopes and the
curatorship of the simulacra of democracy” (Wolin, 33). If the participants within a political
group are led or managed by the upper members of the group, the ability of the average citizen to
act and think politically is severely hindered. By managing and leading political “free-thinking,”
creative boundaries are constructed and free-thinking is restricted within the framework of
preexisting ideas created by the political leadership. As a result, problem-solving is hindered by
these barriers which political free-thinking cannot overcome. A leadership style of democracy is
creatively inefficient as it is unable to best solve problems that may arise in society when
compared to a democracy without political leadership that generates freer thinking by its
representatives and citizens. The ability to solve problems is crucial for the governing body, and
a style of governance that reduces this ability to overcome problems and create solutions should
not be cultivated. Not only are there limitations upon free-thinking, but the citizens that are
involved with directing and engaging in free-thinking that impacts political outcomes are limited
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to those that are within political leadership positions. Therefore, instead of political leadership by
the few, political collaboration by the many and the elimination of boundary creation that
restricts free-thinking in the political realm would be a more democratic ideal.
Wolin continues to develop this critique of leadership democracy by stating that the
politics within this system of governance “is based not, as its defenders allege, upon
‘representative democracy’ but on various representations of democracy: democracy as
represented in public opinion polls, electronic town meetings and phone-ins, and as votes”
(Wolin, 34). Rather than engaging in true democracy where citizens have equal potential for
political involvement, methods to attempt to show that the decisions made by the few align with
the desires of the many become the simulacra of democracy—leadership democracy eliminates
the possibility of the cultivation of actual democracy by controlling the creativity within politics.
Wolin does not appear to believe that democracy exists within the current understanding of a
democratic system, but instead believes that “democracy is not about where the political is
located but about how it is experienced” (Wolin, 38). For Wolin, democracy appears to exist
through the actions taken by individuals aiming to achieve their political potential, not the
system itself. Therefore, based on this theory, every individual must be able to reach their
political potential and in that moment in which they engage in the political sphere is where
democracy exists. In this critique, citizens are unable to reach their political potential due to the
fact that their potential is pruned by leadership. Free-thinking that has the potential to exist
outside of the boundaries of leadership are unable to flourish. Intellectual and creative potential
in politics are essential for citizens to reach their potential and for democracy to exist. A
democracy in which equivalent opportunity to achieve potentials is required for citizens in order
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to have the right of experience and possibility to partake in political decision-making (Wolin, 3943).

It is not only necessary for citizens to have equal political potentials, but is also required
that citizens have equal potentials in regards to public deliberation, according to Seyla Benhabib.
Benhabib’s conception of democratic legitimacy contests that it must be derived from “the free
and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern” (Benhabib, 68).
In this thinking, a system of governance that calls itself democratic but does not allow all
members to equally participate in deliberation is an illegitimate form of democracy. Benhabib
further adds to the discussion of democratic deliberation and focuses particularly on the acts of
deliberation each citizen should have equal access to within a democracy:
[…] participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and
symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to
interrogate, and to open debate, all have the right to question the assigned topics
of conversation, and all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the
very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or
carried out (Benhabib, 70).
This conception of deliberative democracy does not invoke the requirement of deliberation
impacting decision-making, but instead focuses on the ability of all citizens to be involved in the
discussion as to what rational conclusions and topics should be addressed for the majority. In
other words, the free and equal deliberation among citizens exists within the public and not only
within representative bodies. Deliberation must be conducted and directed by all citizens,
contrary to the function of political leadership which determines the topics which are deliberated.
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In this conception of democracy, citizens determine both the topics of deliberation and the course
of deliberation itself.

The concept of deliberation within democracy is further developed by Joshua Cohen as
he aims to shift the focus not only onto the equal ability of individuals to participate, but also
analyzes the outcomes in a democratic society as well. Cohen claims that “the test for democratic
legitimacy will be, in part, substantive—dependent on the content of outcomes, not simply on the
processes through which they are reached” (Cohen, 95). According to this, not only does the
process of involvement matter for a democracy, but whether or not the involvement is actually
connected to the outcomes is also key. Essentially, when the ability to deliberate among citizens
generates equal involvement regarding the topics that are to be discussed, the outcomes of policy
would be aligned with the deliberation and involvement of citizens, rather than its own separate
entity. If everyone can equally deliberate, but the only decision-makers are separate from this
completely equal group, the deliberation then has no concrete connection to whatever policies
are enacted. Therefore, public deliberation among citizens must permeate into the decisions
made by representatives of the public or the decision-making processes that exist within a
specific system. If the process of deliberation does not impact the outcomes of decision-making,
then democratic deliberation in this scenario exists separately from policy and would not
generate decisions supported by the many. This idea of detachment between deliberation and
decision-making will be returned to later in the paper, but for now the discussion on the
necessary qualities of democracy will continue.
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One way to avoid this disconnect in which deliberation does not have an impact on
decision-making is to ensure that political bodies or representatives in a democracy are
responsive to the public deliberation that occurs. Cohen states that certain social and institutional
conditions must be met, and that one key institutional condition that must exist is met “by
establishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political power to it
through regular competitive elections, conditions of publicity, legislative oversight, and so on”
(Cohen, 99). By leaving the methods open-ended with the attachment of “so on,” Cohen is
allowing for the possibility of other means which can be used to check responsiveness and
accountability of political power, as it is quite clear that the ways in which public accountability
can be achieved is not only limited to the three measures listed. However, it seems that having
elections of members to the decision-making body could theoretically be a method in which
there would be some accountability to public deliberation, but in practice it doesn’t appear that
this is an effective way to ensure responsiveness to the public. If representatives with low
approval ratings, even slightly below majority approval could be a significant figure, continue to
get reelected, the theory that elections serve as a check for public accountability is drawn into
question. These low approval rating may serve as a measurement of the disconnect that exists
between public deliberation and policy. When Cohen states that one piece of the framework that
could ensure responsiveness is the conditions of publicity, it seems that the role of the media to
promote transparency in government could greatly serve as a check on accountability. In theory,
the media can serve as a monitor on decision-makers and how they are aligned or misaligned
with the deliberation and needs of the public. However, if the media becomes focused on
supporting a particular political position, its ability to focus on the needs of the public may fall to
the wayside and supporting its preferred party or ideology may become priority. Not only can
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political ideology influence the actions of the media, but ratings systems become increasingly
important as the type of news that is reported is constricted by what improves a studio’s ratings.
In present conditions, it seems that media may lean towards supporting specific political
positions rather than supporting the needs of the public. The best possible scenario for the media
to act as a check on the accountability of representation may exist when the media is politically
objective and working in the interest of the public rather than working for political or private
interests. Although we already have several of these functions in place, such as elections and
media, to generate responsiveness to the public, it seems that there is not necessarily a direct
driver for elected officials to have to directly align with the public response, other than during
election season. All of these measurements to determine if political power responds to the public
in Cohen’s work seem only to provide soft checks, rather than any concrete way in which
political officials must directly interact with or work with the public deliberation and needs.

Significant portions of the previous literature focus on the qualities of communication
that must occur within a democratic society. Beyond the simple ability to deliberate equally, a
democracy must also allow for open communication between citizens that influences decisionmaking. Different starting points from which the public discourse begins must be cooperative,
rather than competitive according to Iris Marion Young. Young claims that members of a
democracy must “understand differences of culture, social perspective, or particularist
commitment as resources to draw on for reaching understanding in democratic discussion rather
than as divisions that must be overcome” (Young, 120). Communication within the public cannot
occur as separate groups competing against the proposed solutions of other groups, but needs
instead to consist of the population as a whole working to come to a solution to its issues
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together. The competitive model of deliberation leaves out a large percentage of the population
from the decision-making process as opposed to a cooperative model, and only takes into
account the majority or plurality that has been declared the victor through deliberation. A
competitive model of deliberation exists when the purpose of deliberation is for one group to
dominate the other, rather than multiple groups collaborating to create the best conclusion for the
collective groups involved. A cooperation focused model of deliberation would strive to achieve
the best possible solution through critique and creation, rather than the competitive model in
which solutions are pitted against each other and only one is chosen without gaining any of the
ideas available by other solutions. The competitive model limits the solution to the victor of
deliberation, while the cooperative model produces a solution that draws ideas from each group
involved.

Failing to recognize difference in democratic communication also limits the points of
discussion within the public. If the only discussion occurs based on what the individuals believe
that they have in common, no additional perspectives are shared and no new information is
considered. As Young claims, “the assumption of prior unity obviates the need for the selftranscendence. If discussion succeeds primarily when it appeals to what the discussants all share,
then none need revise their opinions or viewpoints in order to take account of perspectives and
experiences beyond them” (Young, 125). The starting point of an assumed group identity
prevents individual differences from arising in discussion. Deliberation from within this situation
begins from a myth and isn’t productive towards political decisions that align with the needs of
the public, but if the differences are first recognized prior to deliberation, then the deliberation is
productive as it is no longer based on this myth of commonality, but is based on the reality of

Nellis 9
difference. This assumption is especially damaging if the assumed communal starting point is
actually false, not only limiting the future discussion, but creating an image that does not in fact
unify the public. An assumed identity would also strictly limit discussion by “othering” or
ignoring the deliberation of those who do not fit this exact identity. Eliminating those who do not
necessarily meet the assumed unifying identity further limits the diversity of discussion within
the public. “Othering” in a situation where it is only “us or them” creates these harmful effects.
However, “othering” in a situation where instead of simply “us or them” the understood reality is
that “we are all others” creates the positive effect of allowing this deliberation to begin from real
difference and not mythical commonality. The differences in these two types of “otherings” exist
in the purposes, one of which is to separate from the majority or common group, and the second
is to understand difference and constructively move forward from those various starting points.

An assumed group identity can also lead to harmful effects for representation within a
democracy. This concern over a unified identity can lead the public to be more concerned with
the representation of that same mythical commonality of the community, rather than the actuality
of the community. Anne Phillips adds to this discussion by stating that “what is to be represented
then takes priority over who does the representation. Issues of political presence are largely
discounted, for when difference is considered in terms of intellectual diversity, it does not much
matter who represents the range of ideas” (Phillips, 140-141). By beginning from the point of
myth, citizens are grouped as one under this idea, leading representation to focus on the idea and
not the citizens themselves. By overlooking citizens completely in representation, the priority is
placed on maintaining and working for this myth. Reality is pushed to the side and the myth of
community becomes the focal point if democracy is constructed with this foundation of a false
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common. This function of democracy is counterintuitive to its own purpose by limiting the
diversity of viewpoints that are involved in the government, leading to a misrepresentation based
on the assumed identity or assumed communal values of the public.

This separation between the assumed identity and the actual representation in government
is what leads to the conflict between Phillip’s concepts of a politics of ideas and a politics of
presence. Rather than including all members of the public, the focus on the politics of ideas leads
to the exclusion of public groups from representation by only requiring the representatives to
represent the ideas that are “shared” by the community. Representation then is steered towards
only focusing on representing the values of the assumed public, and can fail to represent the real
public by not allowing groups to have a presence in representation (Phillips, 140-141). This
focus on ideas rather than presence in politics can lead the public, or at least those in
representation positions, to become entrenched in only the assumed ideas that are important to
the public. Phillips states that “if the range of ideas has been curtailed by orthodoxies that
rendered alternatives invisible, there will be no satisfactory solution short of changing the people
who represent and develop ideas” (Phillips, 142). Not only must those individuals that are
representatives of the public change, but groups must be able to question their identities in a
genealogical manner (Phillips, 144). This dual method to shift the focus of politics from ideas to
presence allows representation within a democracy to be both ideologically and culturally
representative of the various groups of the public.

A key issue that arises when certain groups are left out of decision-making is that groups
are advocated for by representatives that may not actually know what would be the best policies

Nellis 11
to pursue to benefit said group. Phillips states that “where policy initiatives are worked out for
rather than with a politically excluded constituency, they rarely engage with all relevant
concerns” (Phillips, 147). The smaller the group that is within representative bodies, the less the
relevancy of the policies that are created and passed by the government. Limiting the groups that
are represented not only reduces the decision-making skills that are present, but always reduces
the cultural and economic awareness that is needed to create legislation that properly addresses
the needs of various communities. The assigned needs of a group by an “outsider” prevents the
actual needs of that group from being known by policy makers. Instead, it creates a perpetual
sinkhole in which the assumed needs are fought for, but once, or if, these arduous battles are
won, no actual progress is seen in that section of the community due to the fact that they were
fighting for something that didn’t need to be the priority. A lack of presence in politics for
classes or groups leads to their needs being prescribed to them by representatives, rather than the
representatives being from their own class or group that understands the community’s actual
needs.

In order to incorporate a politics of presence into a democratic government, the plurality
of society must be embraced both from cultural and political standpoints. Accepting this plurality
allows the public to fully address the needs it has, while still recognizing the needs of separate
groups rather than simply fulfilling the needs of the majority and creating policies from there
(Mouffe, 246). Recognizing plurality in society “refuses the objective of unanimity and
homogeneity which is always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion” (Mouffe,
246). If this false collective were to be accepted by the public, then having representatives that
only identify with this image would be deemed legitimate representatives of their constituents.
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Accepting the false commonality leads to reducing presence within representative bodies. By
reducing presence in politics, the only citizens that truly have a presence within decision-making
are those that align with the false common identity of society. For all of the other citizens that do
not fit this assumed identity, they lack a presence in politics and therefore would be outsiders
within their own government’s decision-making. The political usefulness of perpetuating the idea
that there are in fact separate identity groups within one society prevents the common identity
myth from validating the representation of only one group within decision-making bodies. By
recognizing the diversity within a society, the need for diverse presence within representation
would follow suit. Presence in politics should be equally diverse as the various identities within a
given society.

Along the same school of thought as the need to recognize plurality in democracy, the
need for diversity in skill sets of representatives is discussed by Hélène Landemore. Landemore
begins her discussion by claiming the usefulness of heuristics in the political realm. Heuristics
can be defined as “second-best rules of thumb that can be used in lieu of the more adequate
complex models only available under ideal circumstances” (Landemore, 162). Heuristics are not
considered to be ideal, but are “‘highly economical and usually effective’ given the limited
computational abilities of human beings” (Landemore, 162). Landemore claims that the use of
political heuristics is necessary based on the complexity and uncertainty that is present within the
political sphere.

For Landemore, complexity refers to the “various cognitive limitations, as well as to
more ambiguous causes such as the vagueness of our concepts and the limited social space
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available to reconcile values” (Landemore, 164). Uncertainty refers to the “realm of outcomes
and associated risk that we are not aware of” as well as “the absence of knowledge about not just
the probabilities attached to certain known outcomes, but the absence of knowledge about the
very nature and number of potential outcomes and their associated probabilities” within the
political realm (Landemore, 165-166). In essence, governance from this perspective is necessary
to address both the complexity and uncertainty faced within political decisions. Therefore, the
form of governance that is chosen should be that which best addresses these two qualities of
politics. Landemore thus sees a political heuristic as the most effective manner with which
humans can work to limit the effects of complexity and uncertainty within the political. The next
step beyond identifying the use of heuristics for governance as the most effective way to address
complexity and uncertainty entails evaluating the effectiveness of a specific heuristic and
identifying what qualities of the heuristic are necessary to maximize its own effectiveness.
Heuristics have been identified as the most effective governance method—the next phase is to
analyze and increase the effectiveness of the most effective platform.
Landemore claims that the most rational political heuristic that humans can employ is
democracy. The two components of democracy that make it the most viable heuristic for the
political sphere are “deliberation among free and equal citizens, and majority rule” (Landemore,
166). Landemore follows the previous literature on the components of democracy by reinforcing
her theory with a focus on deliberation within democracy, but the notion of majority rule does
not immediately refer to identity representation or presence, but in practice would achieve these
goals through equal inclusion in decision-making for all in society.
Another key support for democracy as the most rational heuristic is its level of
inclusiveness for decision-making, especially when compared to other forms of governance with
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limited diversity within decision-making bodies, such as an aristocracy or autocracy. The need
for the greatest level of inclusiveness stems from the need to make the heuristic as effective as
possible at addressing the issues of complexity and uncertainty. By including members from all
of society rather than a small portion, cognitive diversity is increased and the skill sets for
problem solving increases alongside it. Cognitive diversity refers to the multiplicity of
viewpoints and skill sets that would be present if members from groups that span all of society
are included in decision-making bodies, rather than only one or a few groups. A high level of
cognitive diversity makes democracy more effective as it provides greater possibility to find
solutions to problems in society, which helps to reduce this specific unknown variable in the
public policy equation (Landemore, 167). By increasing the diversity of presence in this
heuristic, the knowledge of issues faced by society is also expanded. In order to make this style
of equal inclusion the most effective, the weights of deliberation and votes provided by various
citizens must also be equal (Landemore, 168). If citizens have unequal rights or influence
through speech, then the public deliberation of some would have greater impacts than others, and
if something such as plural voting (when the vote of a single citizen is counted multiple times or
weighted differently) is in place, then the voices of citizens within democratic decision-making
are not truly equal (Landemore, 168).
Including the entire population in decision-making also provides the advantage of greater
breadth of political knowledge. Landemore assumes throughout her work that “the larger
population’s knowledge is more evenly distributed across all political issues than political
experts’ knowledge” (Landemore, 171). While the “experts” may be able to come up with a
greater number of particular solutions to a specific societal problem, this would not as effectively
combat political uncertainty when compared to the wide variety of solutions for individual
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problems as well as all of the societal problems which policy would need to address. The
question for Landemore’s heuristic is “not [focused on] how to choose between pre-defined laws
and policies, but who to include and on what terms in the decision-process is meant to identify
these options and then settle on one of them” (Landemore, 170). Landemore concludes that the
presence of radical uncertainty in the political leads to “radical equality [becoming] the only
rational heuristic” (Landemore, 174). Radical equality becomes the only rational heuristic as
radical equality leads a heuristic governance model to be as effective in the political sphere as it
can possibly be. Radical equality is necessary for the effectiveness of governance to reach its full
potential.
Despite the discussion on deliberation, dialogue, identity, and rational governance in the
previous literature, there appears to be a gap in research, specifically in regards to economic
representation within democracy. Although representation based on identity is discussed by
previous thinkers, the necessity for representation based on economic status may be equally
important. In this context, economic representation refers to the presence of representatives from
a particular economic status within the decision-making bodies of the government. In a similar
manner that representation and presence based on identity requires separate groups to be
recognized and embraced within the government, economic representation and presence would
also require the acknowledgment that there are various economic statuses within the society.
This does not mean that the fact that varying economic classes exist within society merely needs
to be known, but instead means that this acknowledgement of economic difference needs to be
recognized and addressed within the political sphere. By first recognizing the economic
difference, this recognition can become integral to representation in politics and can allow for
greater presence of underrepresented economic groups. In a similar manner that the myth of a
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common identity reduces political presence and has harmful effects, an assumed economic
commonality or status would also reduce presence in politics and have harmful effects.
Economic difference is becoming increasingly important as the inequality of wealth
continues to grow within developed nations and the world altogether. In the United States alone,
income inequality has greatly increased “since [the] 1980s” (Piketty, 294). Within the last three
decades, “the upper [class’] share [of national income has] increased from 30-35 percent of
national income in the 1970s to 45-50 percent in the 2000s—an increase of 15 points of national
income” (Piketty, 294). Regardless of one’s views on the relationship between inequality and
justice, this level of income inequality within the United States is argued to have had a
significant impact on the financial crisis in the 2000s. Thomas Piketty states that the increase in
inequality in the United States led to a “virtual stagnation of the purchasing power of the lower
and middle classes in the United States” (Piketty, 297). If these economic inequalities between
classes are duplicated and become representative or political inequalities between classes, the
issues created by vast inequality would be perpetuated within society. Recognizing income
inequality and its effects on the economy can lead a society to prevent these same outcomes from
occurring within policy-making. If the policy power of the lower and middle classes is stunted
while the political influence of the upper class dramatically increases, then the same harmful
effects at the hands of inequality that occurred within the economy will occur within
government. Recognizing economic difference in politics will prevent the political power of the
lower and middle classes from being limited by ensuring that the myth of a common economic
class in a single country is not perpetuated within governmental representation. This myth of a
common economic class can occur when it is determined that society is enhancing its quality of
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life through increased GDP or lower unemployment, although the actual benefits of these
measurements may be felt the most by small portions of the population.
Not acknowledging economic difference can have the same harmful effects within the
political as failing to acknowledge various identities, or creating a single, false identity for the
society in which decisions are rooted. These harmful effects may be even greater for failing to
recognize economic difference than failing to recognize identity difference if the representatives
elected all stem from a single economic group that may be an extreme minority in the country.
If economic difference is ignored and instead the economic status of the community as a whole is
used to make policy decisions, a significant portion of the population may be marginalized
depending on what economic status or statuses have a presence within representation. However,
problems can still exist if economic difference is recognized, but economic presence is not
attained. This would generate the issue of representation for various economic groups by
members of other economic groups rather than their own. The actual needs of some groups
would be left out of deliberation, and policy that is created to benefit those that are not present
would be prescribed rather than created through cooperation. The presence of all groups that
have the right to deliberate within the democracy is necessary for all of these perspectives of
deliberation to influence the process and outcomes of decision-making.
The recognition and presence of economic difference is also necessary when analyzing
the deliberation within a democracy. In the age of mass media, economic difference plays a
crucial role in the level of equality in public deliberation. Individuals who own media
corporations or news outlets have a significantly greater voice in public deliberation as they can
control what is communicated to possibly millions of citizens. This imbalance in public
deliberation makes it that much more important to have equal deliberation within decision-
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making. If the public may not be equal in this realm due to economic difference, then it must be
guaranteed that deliberation between various economic statuses be equal within representative
bodies by ensuring that each group has a proportionate presence within the government. The
current lack of economic presence and recognition may be caused by a similar myth of
commonality that was previously discussed in regards to identity. If the nation’s economic
problems are taken as a singular issue, specific economic groups that may be taking the brunt of
the shortcomings may be overlooked. Rather than understanding the intricate details of the
groups in society that are at an economic disadvantage, the focus tends to be on communal
measurements of stability, such as GDP or unemployment rate. While these measurements for
the quality of life in a society may improve through governmental action, these improvements
may only be felt by a small percentage of the citizens. General measurements of improvement
fail to specify what groups specifically improved from decisions made by government
representatives. A lack of recognition of economic difference would threaten equal deliberation
discussed by both Benhabib and Landemore, but these harmful effects can be reduced by
achieving a politics of presence based on economic representation.
Understanding economic difference may also increase accountability for the
representatives of each economic group. If an election system were to still be in place, citizens
would campaign to be representatives of their specific economic status. This could possibly
increase accountability due to the representative running in order to directly support his or her
economic group, and could also increase legislative effectiveness as each representative would
directly know the needs of the group as they themselves are part of it. If this were to work
together with current electoral districts that are in place, a possible change that could be made
would be to increase representatives based on economic make-up of districts, or to have the
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majority group of the district have an elected official. However, maintaining a district system
would be difficult with the implementation of elections based on economic identity. In the
current system, one representative can be elected for a district that could contain a multitude of
economic groups. After economic difference is recognized, elections could possible serve as a
stiffer check on accountability for representatives.
Economic difference would also have significant impacts on the conceptualization of
democracy as a heuristic device for Landemore. It seems that the next logical step based on
Landemore’s work is a possible shift from election based representation towards something
similar to a lottery to determine representatives. A lottery would provide equal opportunity for
all citizens to be involved within the decision-making process. A lottery would also generate the
possibility of creating a diverse skill set for problem solving by eliminating known variables that
may determine who is able to run a campaign for election and replacing them with uncertainty.
This would also reduce the use of experts from a single identity in decision-making and provide
the possibility for every identity to have a potential presence in representation. If economic
difference were still unrecognized, then regardless if a representative lottery were set in place or
not, there would still be a lack of economic recognition and presence in decision-making.
Economic difference must be recognized in order to allow for various groups to have a presence
in representation, and understanding this difference would help to create the structure of the
representative lottery.
Although Landemore argues that egalitarian inclusiveness is superior as a heuristic over
inegalitarian inclusiveness, recognizing economic difference could possibly lead to this heuristic
leaning towards inegalitarian inclusiveness for the better. If the representative lottery were to be
put in place after economic difference were present in the political sphere, it could be an
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effective tactic to proportionately represent each economic group by providing lottery picks to
each economic group equal to its portion of the population. This could possibly be considered
inegalitarian by limiting the potential of representative inclusion based on economic status, but
would provide each economic group with its necessary presence in decision-making. Conducting
the lottery this way would also provide cognitive and skill diversity by selecting representatives
from all economic groups in the society. This style of a controlled lottery may provide greater
cognitive ability than a straight lottery due to the fact that members of each economic group
would be present, and therefore, the issues faced by each group would be known and present
within representation.
It may be pertinent to conduct this representative lottery based on economic identity
rather than culture, gender, ethnic, or other identities as all of these other possible qualifiers
would be contained within each economic class. If the lottery were to be conducted using another
identity, each group may not necessarily have a common ground that would help them to
deliberate towards a common political goal. If the lottery were conducted using economic
identity, each group would have economic status as common ground from which policy
decisions can stem. Although they may have disagreements based on culture, ethnicity, or
gender, their economic commonality would allow them to cooperate for common economic
goals in policy.
In a simplistic example to explain what is meant by this type of inegalitarian,
representative lottery, let us assume that there are three economic groups in a society. One way
in which these economic groups can possibly be measured is through net worth of citizens. The
three groups in this society can be understood as lower, middle, and upper. For this example, the
lower economic group contains 50% of the population, the middle group contains 40% of the
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population, and the upper group contains 10% of the population. Based on these percentages, the
lower group would have 50% of the lottery picks for representatives, the middle group 40%, and
the upper group 10%. Essentially, the representative lottery would not be drawn from the general
public as a whole. The percentage of picks available to each group would be proportionate to the
percentage of the population that resides within that group. Therefore, 50% of representatives in
the government are from the lower group, 40% are from the middle group, and 10% are from the
upper group. Understanding economic difference and allowing this to permeate into the
representative lottery structure would guarantee that each economic group would have a presence
within representation that is equal to their presence within society. If the lottery were conducted
as a whole without dividing the number of picks by economic group, each group’s presence in
politics may not be equal to their presence in society.
Although these figures may appear to be completely arbitrary, these percentage
breakdowns of lower, middle, and upper class have been used by economists when analyzing the
distribution of total income within the United States. Thomas Piketty refers to the “bottom 50%”
as the lower class, “the middle 40%” as the middle class, and “the top 10%” as the upper class
(Piketty, 249). Piketty is not attempting to establish these percentages as the strict formation of
classes within the United States as he states that his “definition of ‘middle class’ (as the ‘middle’
40 percent) is highly contestable, since the income (or wealth) of everyone in the group is, by
construction, above the median for the society in question” (Piketty, 251). However, the deciles
created and used by Piketty for this example of inequality in the United States offer significant
insight into the distribution of wealth in this particular society. First, the measurement of total
income in this case refers to the summation of income generated from both labor and capital
(Piketty, 249). The data for the United States in 2010 reveals that the lower class’ share of the
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national income was 20%, the middle class’ share 30%, and the upper class’ share 50% (Piketty,
249). If this same level of inequality were allowed to trickle into political representation, the
upper class would have equal representative power to both the middle and lower class combined.
In reality, the influence of classes may be even more unequal in politics than it currently is in
income. Preventing this same level of inequality within politics is necessary in order to properly
maintain a democratic government and to avoid similar harmful effects upon society that have
been stemmed from the income inequality present in society.
Lastly, it is crucially important to recognize economic difference and allow this
difference to permeate into the political sphere to guarantee that policy is made by and for the
people, instead of simply for the people. By understanding the existence of various economic
groups within society, one can analyze what groups are present in the government as well as the
legislation created by these representatives to determine if there is a disconnect between who is
representing the citizens and what needs are left out by the policies created. There may exist a
gap between socioeconomics and politics which could be preventing citizens within a democracy
from influencing decision-making and to have their needs understood and remedied through
policy. By bridging this gap and joining socioeconomic understanding of class with politics, this
step could be made to push democracy that exists today closer towards the theoretical democracy
which provides proper representation and deliberation to its citizens.
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